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California Constitutional Law:  
The Right to an Adequate Education 
Anne D. Gordon* 
Plaintiffs’ victory in Vergara v. State, a case about teacher evaluation and employment 
regulations, has thrust the issue of educational adequacy into the spotlight in California. 
Campaign for Quality Education v. State, a case based on the California Constitution’s 
education clause, has been fully briefed before the California Supreme Court and is 
waiting to be set for argument. These cases require California courts to again look to the 
constitution to determine what the right to education means. Although the California 
Supreme Court found this right fundamental over forty years ago, no supreme court 
decision has yet articulated whether this right encompasses the right to an adequate 
education. There is no dearth of scholarship about adequacy on the national level, but no 
scholarship has yet synthesized constitutional history and case law in California to test 
how the court should decide the case. Examining these factors, as well as the failure of the 
dominant doctrineequal protectionto define and ensure the right, this Article 
proposes an adequacy jurisprudence that comports with California’s unique 
circumstances, its history and precedent, and the purposes of education in this state. The 
need for such an approach has never been greater. 
 
 
 * Anne Gordon is a Visiting Professor at Instituto Tecnologico de Monterrey in Puebla, 
Mexico. She was formerly a Lecturer and Advocacy Fellow for the Appellate Program and Senior 
Research Fellow with the California Constitution Center at the University of California Berkeley School 
of Law. She received a B.A. in 2001 from Princeton University and a J.D. in 2006 from the University of 
Michigan Law School. Thank you to Dr. David Carrillo for his help and advice throughout the formative 
stages of this Article, and to his California Constitution Center for providing a home for California 
constitutional scholarship. Thank you also to Andrew Garland, John Gordon, Steve Sugarman, John 
Affeldt, Mark Yudof, Rachel Moran, and Chris Hoofnagle for providing thoughtful comments and 
suggestions, and to Bill Fernholz and Barbara Karvelot for being on my team. 
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Introduction 
California’s free schools guarantee in article IX of the state 
constitution contains both a purpose (to further intellectual, scientific, 
moral, and agricultural improvement) and a command (the legislature 
“shall provide” for a system of common schools).1 The California Supreme 
Court has declared education a fundamental right.2 But the contours of 
this right remain unclear. Through decades of litigation concerning 
school finance,3 charter schools,4 and everything from busing schemes5 to 
school fees,6 litigants have tested the substance of article IX again and 
again, with no clear guidance from the supreme court. It is still unclear 
whether there is a qualitative component to the right to an education in 
article IX, and if so, what that qualitative measure requires. 
This lack of clarity has two causes: first, the failure of the California 
Supreme Court to directly address adequacy issues, and second, the inability 
of the dominant litigation doctrine, equal protection, to answer the 
fundamental question about the scope of article IX. 
First, there is little scholarship, and even less law, on how California 
would decide an adequacy question under its constitution. In Serrano v. 
Priest, the California Supreme Court emphasized that the state constitution 
guarantees the right to an education that encompasses “more than access 
to a classroom.”7 Despite this, some have argued that the education 
clauses confer no rights beyond maintaining basic uniformity and 
progression of grades, describing “the demise of the common schools 
clause as a means to pursue students’ basic right to education in California.”8 
Indeed, two lower courts have found that article IX confers no substantive 
right to adequacy.9 
An analysis of the history of education litigation in California, however, 
reveals that the adequacy issue has appeared time and again in the court’s 
history and cases, with the court receptive not only to hearing cases based 
on adequacy, but also deciding cases at least in part on that ground as well. 
This has strong historical underpinnings; from the text of the constitution, 
to the framers’ constitutional debates, to the cases before the supreme 
 
 1. See Cal. Const. art. IX, § 1. 
 2. See infra Part I.C. 
 3. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971). 
 4. Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 753–54 (1999). 
 5. Manjares v. Newton, 411 P.2d 901, 902–03 (Cal. 1966). 
 6. Complaint at 1, Doe v. California, No. BC445151 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2010).  
 7. Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1257. 
 8. See Rebecca M. Abel, The Judicial Give and Take: The Right to Equal Educational 
Opportunity in California, 9 Cal. Legal Hist. 203, 215 (2014). 
 9. See Order Granting Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Second Cause of Action at 
3–4, Williams v. California, No. 312236 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 10, 2003); Order Sustaining Demurrers to 
Complaint and Complaint in Intervention, in Part Without Leave to Amend and in Part With Leave to 
Amend at 8, Robles-Wong v. California, No. RG10-515768 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 14, 2011). 
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court (in both dicta and the holdings), one can see article IX rights taking 
shape as a right to an adequate education. 
The primary goal of this Article is to highlight these developments 
throughout California’s history and jurisprudence. It seeks to prove that 
the constitutional guarantee is enforceable as a right to an adequate 
education, independent from the constitutional guarantee of equality. 
Second, this Article will address the inability of equal protection to 
define and safeguard the right to education in California. Equal protection 
challenges simply compare two things, seeking to resolve whether they are 
sufficiently equivalent to pass constitutional muster. Here, that means 
determining whether two educational programs are comparable. But that 
analysis, while well-suited to resolving disparate treatment claims, does not 
concern itself with whether the quality or content of an educational 
program is constitutionally adequate under article IX. 
The limitations of an equal protection approach, for instance, 
ensuring that children are treated equally in areas such as funding or 
educational programming, have led to a shift in the litigation landscape. In 
recent years, litigants in many states have changed their approach to one 
promoting adequacy, ensuring that all schools meet a baseline of quality. 
Under this approach, the relevant analysis does not simply compare schools 
or programs. Instead, it focuses on ensuring that the education provided to 
every student meets a minimum bar of quality. 
Equal protection litigation is still a critical tool for education reform in 
California, and has led to many of the landmark decisions highlighted in 
this Article. But relying solely on equal protection is insufficient to define 
the right, and might deny a fundamental right to many students who might 
have an “equal,” but ineffective, education. 
Part I of this Article reviews the text and legislative history surrounding 
the passage of article IX to show an enforceable, qualitative right to 
education. These historical sources give a great deal of guidance into 
what the framers thought about the right to education in California, and 
its importance to the political, economic, and moral future of the state. 
This Part also reviews the seminal cases in California education, arguing 
that although many are phrased in the language of equal protection or 
the free schools guarantee, they each have adequacy as a logical and 
ethical underpinning. These cases also show that although the constitution 
explicitly assigns to the legislature the job of ensuring a public school 
system, the court will step in where it appears that students are denied the 
critical components of a decent education. 
Part II details why equal-protection-focused education litigation is 
limited in its ability to guarantee the right to education. First, viewing the 
right to education solely as an equal protection problem ignores the text 
and history of the constitutional provision, subsuming it in a discussion of 
equality when in fact it deserves recognition as a stand-alone right. 
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Second, equal protection, standing alone, does little to solve the 
underlying question of what the right entails. This Article rejects the 
possibility that, as the Kentucky Supreme Court has said, an educational 
program achieves equality by ensuring “uniformly deplorable conditions” 
throughout the state.10 The California Supreme Court has avoided the 
question by using the phrase “basic educational equality,” implying a 
baseline, but never defining it.11 Without a definition, the court is left with 
the “guess-and-check,” case-by-case approach we see today (finding, for 
example, free extracurriculars, but not busing, to be part of the right).12 
Finally, this Article argues that equal protection is a misnomer; in 
addition to being an unattainable goal, true educational equality—that is, 
making all schools equal—has never been the goal of education 
litigation. Nor does it alleviate the possibility of “basically equal” but 
grossly inadequate schools, something that the court (and the framers) 
would likely find problematic. 
Just as with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the U.S. 
Constitution, the right to education in California without a guarantee of 
quality would render the right hollow. Just as the right to counsel under 
the U.S. Constitution requires that such counsel be effective, so too does 
the fundamental right to an education require that an education conform 
to a minimum guarantee of effectiveness—that is, to a minimum 
guarantee of quality. 
Part III turns to other states whose high courts have wrestled with 
these same questions. A review of these cases shows that no state 
supreme court has found a fundamental right to education without a 
minimum guarantee of quality; where there is a right, there is a 
minimum. If California continues to affirm the right by upholding 
Serrano but finds no corresponding qualitative mandate, it would stand 
alone. 
Part IV outlines different approaches that the court can take when 
defining an adequate education. This Article argues that none of the 
prevailing methods is sufficient to fulfill the California Constitution’s 
mandate within the context of its history and text. Instead, it proposes a 
citizenship approach to defining adequacy, based on Justice Goodwin 
Liu’s influential article, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship.13 
This method requires sufficient education to enable citizens to develop a 
stable economy, become upwardly mobile, and engage in self-
government, such that they are able to participate in the political life of 
the state. This method accords historically with the framers’ intent in 
 
 10. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989). 
 11. See, e.g., Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Cal. 1992). 
 12. Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 47 (Cal. 1984) (extracurriculars); Manjares v. Newton, 
411 P.2d 901, 908 (Cal. 1966) (busing). 
 13. Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 Yale L.J. 330 (2006). 
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passing the education clauses in the California Constitution, underlies 
many of the education cases throughout the California Supreme Court’s 
history, and, in the words of the California Supreme Court, is “directly 
linked to the constitutional role of education in preserving democracy, as 
set forth in article IX, section 1 . . . .”14 
This Article does not aim to curb the policy debate on what 
constitutes a quality education in California, or how to reduce or eliminate 
disparities within the school system and beyond. Nor does it seek to 
foreclose efforts to ensure equal access to education using equal 
protection litigation; where inequality exists that runs afoul of the equal 
protection clause, a constitutional claim will (and should) succeed. This 
Article has only the modest goal of assisting the state judiciary in crafting 
an analysis for the qualitative issues presented by article IX that it will 
inevitably face in the coming years. 
I.  Implicit Adequacy in the Text and History of the Constitution 
A. The Text of the California Education Clause 
The California Constitution guarantees a system of free schools for the 
children of the state.15 The text itself is robust, including both a statement of 
purpose and a functional element. The preamble, codified in article IX, 
section 1, entitled “Encouragement of education,” states that a “ general 
diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation 
of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall encourage by 
all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and 
agricultural improvement.”16 Article IX, sections 2 through 4 then establish 
a Superintendent of Public Instruction and county education boards.17 
Finally, section 5 on the “Common school system” establishes California’s 
school system: “The Legislature shall provide for a system of common 
schools by which a free school shall be kept up and supported in each 
district at least six months in every year, after the first year in which a 
school has been established.”18 
B. The History 
The constitutional text is unambiguous in its directive to establish state 
public schools. But it is ambiguous—indeed silent—on the question of what 
would run afoul of that directive (aside from violating the requirement of 
a free school in each district, open for six months every year). 
 
 14. Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 43. 
 15. Cal. Const. art. IX, § 5. 
 16. Id. art. IX, § 1. 
 17. See id. art IV, §§ 2–4. 
 18. Id. art. IX, § 5. 
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When texts are ambiguous, we look to history for guidance.19 The 
goal here is always “to discern the true intent of their authors, and when 
that intent has been ascertained,” to construe them as to give it effect.20 
As the California Supreme Court has said, although the constitution is 
“necessarily couched in general terms or language, it is not to be 
interpreted according to narrow or supertechnical principles, but liberally 
and on broad general lines, so that it may accomplish in full measure the 
objects of its establishment and so carry out the great principles of 
government.”21 For these reasons, examining the framers’ perspectives by 
looking briefly at California’s educational history, the framers’ experiences 
in other states’ conventions, and the constitutional convention debates is 
instructive in deciphering the meaning and intended force of article IX. 
1. The Framers’ Understanding of the Education Clauses 
Understanding the education clauses requires an understanding of 
the education climate in the late 1870s, including the political climate 
surrounding school legislation in California before the 1879 constitution 
and other states’ clauses from that time. 
Any review of the history of California schools would be incomplete 
without reference to John Swett. Swett was born in New Hampshire, 
moved to California, and became a principal at a school in San Francisco.22 
In 1862, he was elected State Superintendent of Public Schools and 
became a fierce lobbyist for free schools.23 He believed strongly in two 
principles that animated his work: “[f]irst, that it is the duty of a . . . 
[g]overnment . . . to provide for the education of every child,” and 
second, that the schools should be provided to students for free.24 In 
1865, he launched a major statewide public relations campaign to lobby 
for his vision of public schools, including a massive petition campaign 
targeted at legislators on the value of education,25 which was described as 
“an act of self-preservation in a democracy,” and vital to the welfare of 
the state.26 He toured the state to evaluate various schools’ conditions, 
lamenting the physical facilities, desks, and textbooks as well as poor 
teacher qualifications and pedagogical methods.27 His lobbying included 
a massive petition campaign targeted at legislatures, to persuade them 
 
 19. Mejia v. Reed, 74 P.3d 166, 170 (Cal. 2003). 
 20. Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 161, 180 (1864). 
 21. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1299 
(Cal. 1978). 
 22. William G. Carr, John Swett: The Biography of an Educational Pioneer 4 (1933). 
 23. Irving G. Hendrick, California Education: A Brief History 11 (Norris Hundley, Jr. & 
John A. Schutz eds., 1980). 
 24. Carr, supra note 22, at 102. 
 25. Hendrick, supra note 23, at 13–15. 
 26. Carr, supra note 22, at 102. 
 27. Hendrick, supra note 23, at 15. 
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that a good education meant instruction in reading, writing, and “all 
manner of practical studies.”28 He also frequently referred to the “necessity 
for suitable buildings, capable teachers, adequate equipment, and state 
inspection and supervision.”29 He felt that the teacher was “the most 
potent single factor in determining the efficiency of the school.”30 Swett 
mounted such an effective campaign that most legislators quickly joined 
his cause.31 His influence remained even after his tenure as Superintendent 
ended; in 1874, the legislature approved “An Act to Enforce the 
Education Right of Children,” the state’s compulsory attendance law,32 and 
in 1879, the education committee for the constitutional convention 
“generally agreed on all the major educational issues.”33 
Looking to extraterritorial influences on the California Constitution, 
California’s article IX was explicitly based on at least two other states’ 
constitutions. Joseph W. Winans,34 chairperson for the convention’s 
Committee on Education, reported that section 1 was “taken from the 
Constitutions of Arkansas and Missouri, in part, and from the 
Constitution of this State.”35 He emphasized that the “same words” are 
contained in the Missouri and Arkansas constitutions.36 Dr. Lucius 
Morse, who was in Missouri in 1865 during that state’s constitutional 
convention, recounted that, “We started out in Missouri with the idea of 
free education, and the idea has been copied throughout the Southern 
States. Section one of the article on education is in other Constitutions 
almost in the same language that is embodied in this.”37 
Missouri’s role in providing its citizens a public education was 
outlined in its territorial charter in 1812, which stated: “[K]nowledge, 
being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, 
schools and the means of public education shall be encouraged and 
provided for . . . .”38 In 1891, the Missouri Supreme Court called 
 
 28. Id. at 18. This campaign resulted in dozens of letters daily appearing on the desks of 
legislatures during the 1866 legislative session. Id. at 1314.  
 29. Carr, supra note 22, at 102. He also believed that the state should enforce minimum 
standards of safety and sanitation. 
 30. Id. at 104. 
 31. Hendrick, supra note 23, at 14. 
 32. Id. at 17. 
 33. Id. at 19. 
 34. Winans was a lawyer and representative from the First Congressional District. Roy W. 
Cloud, Education in California: Leaders, Organizations, and Accomplishments of the First 
Hundred Years 67 (1952). 
 35. 2 Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of California 
1087 (1881) [hereinafter 1879 Debates].  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1089. 
 38. Territorial Laws of Missouri, vol. I, ch. IV, § 14 at 13 (approved June 4, 1812) (cited in Comm. 
for Educ. Equality v. Missouri, 294 S.W.3d 477, 482 n.5 (Mo. 2009)). 
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education “a right created by the state, and a right belonging to citizens 
of this state as such.”39 
The 1865 Missouri Constitution provides that, “the General 
Assembly shall establish and maintain free schools, for the gratuitous 
instruction of all persons in this State, between the ages of five and 
twenty-one years.”40 Further, “[o]nly the constitutions of New Jersey in 
1844 and Wisconsin in 1848, twenty years earlier, had similarly spoken in 
terms of ‘all’ children rather than in terms of a ‘system’ of schools, but 
beginning with the Missouri Constitution of 1865 such language became 
more common.”41 
Looking to the history of the Arkansas Constitution, the framers of 
the first Arkansas Constitution adopted the following Education Clause 
in 1836:  
Knowledge and learning generally diffused through a community being 
essential to the preservation of a free government; and diffusing the 
opportunities and advantages of education through the various parts of the 
State being highly conducive to this end . . . . The General Assembly 
shall, from time to time, pass such laws as shall be calculated to 
encourage intellectual, scientific and agricultural improvement by 
allowing rewards and immunities for the promotion and improvement of 
Arts, Science, Commerce, Manufactures and Natural History. And 
countenance and encourage the principels [sic] of humanity, industry and 
morality.42  
This provision embodied two fundamental ideas: “the inherent value of 
education in creating a virtuous citizen and the crucial role of an educated 
citizenry in a functioning democracy.”43 In a later Arkansas Supreme 
Court decision, the court concluded that given this history, “[t]here is no 
question in this court’s mind that the requirement of a general, suitable, 
and efficient system of free public schools places on the State an absolute 
duty to provide the school children of Arkansas with an adequate 
education.”44 
The framers of the California Constitution, by explicitly borrowing 
from the robust provisions in the Arkansas Constitution and the Missouri 
Constitution, must have intended to give California’s education clause 
similar force. Swett’s legacy, as well, focused not just on providing 
education, but also on ensuring that the children of California had 
enough education to ensure the perpetuation of democracy. The history, 
as communicated through the language of article IX, is clear: the framers 
 
 39. Lehew v. Brummell, 15 S.W. 765, 766 (Mo. 1891). 
 40. Mo. Const. of 1865, art. IX, § 1. 
 41. John C. Eastman, When Did Education Become a Civil Right? An Assessment of State 
Constitutional Provisions for Education 1776–1900, 42 Am. J. Legal Hist. 1, 23 (1998). 
 42. Ark. Const. of 1836, art. VII, § 1 (1987). 
 43. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips Cty. v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 491 (Ark. 2002). 
 44. Id. at 492. 
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felt the necessity of an educated populace in furthering the causes of self-
government and general well-being. To this end, an adequate education, 
not simply any education, was the intent of the provision. 
2. The 1849 and 1879 Constitutional Conventions 
During the state’s first constitutional convention in preparation for 
the 1849 constitution, the framers had a robust debate concerning the 
education provision. There, delegate Morton McCarver, using the 
example of other states, admonished the rest of the convention that there 
was no greater use for its wealth than to provide schools for future 
generations, both for the good of the individual child and the good of the 
state: 
Nothing will have a greater tendency to secure prosperity to the State, 
stability to our institutions, and an enlightened state of society, than by 
providing for the education of our posterity. Some of the ablest men 
we have in the United States are men from the poorest origin, who 
have had their minds opened to the advantages of knowledge by public 
schools. Educate the children of this country, and you will find in the 
halls of the Legislature of California men, able statesmen too, of the 
poorest origin.45 
Robert Semple, the president of the constitutional convention, similarly 
asked whether any “ha[d] ever seen a school fund sufficiently large to 
answer every purpose, or secure too great a spread of knowledge[.]”46 
Delegates emphasized the need of a school system to train children to 
use language, to prepare them to be citizens, to help them prepare to face 
the conflicts of life, to prepare them for higher education, and to “carry 
on intelligently and successfully the ordinary labors of life.”47 
After the 1849 convention, the framers issued a notice “[t]o [t]he 
People [o]f California,” where they “respectfully submit[ted] the 
accompanying plan of government for your approval.”48 In this notice, 
the framers emphasized that:  
A knowledge of the laws, their moral force and efficacy [is] an essential 
element of freedom, and makes public education of primary importance. 
In this view, the Constitution of California provides for and guarantees 
in the most ample manner, the establishment of common schools, 
seminaries, and colleges, so as to extend the blessings of education 
throughout the land, and secure its advantages to the present and 
future generations.49 
 
 45. Report of the Debates in the Convention of California, on the Formation of the State 
Constitution, in September and October, 1849 204 (1850) [hereinafter 1849 Debates]. 
 46. Id. 
 47. 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1102; 3 Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional 
Convention of the State of California 1412–13 (1881). 
 48. 1849 Debates, supra note 45, at 474. 
 49. Id. 
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This enthusiasm for public education remained robust in the 1879 
constitutional convention. The framers there, many of whom had been 
present at the 1849 convention, again engaged in a robust discussion 
about what language should be included in the final education provision. 
A review of the transcript shows every speaker in favor of a free 
education for the children of California. While there was some debate 
about whether the free schools guarantee should extend past the 
“common school” (elementary) level,50 not one delegate disagreed with 
the language establishing the state’s schools, nor with the importance of 
educating children. Throughout the debates, the framers referred to 
education as the gateway to a robust economic future in the state, the 
key to self-governance, and a gateway out of poverty for the individual. 
This review supports the idea that a quality school represents the 
fulfillment of these ideals. 
Chairperson Winans extolled the virtues of public education, as “the 
basis of self-government . . . constitut[ing] the very corner stone of 
republican institutions.”51 He noted that in articles from the “original 
states’” constitutions, the subject of education was merely mentioned, 
but did not take the form of a legislative enactment: “[i]t was merely the 
broad declaration of a high principle.”52 Yet, “as the time advanced and 
the condition of the people improved,” the education clauses finally 
“attained to the dignity of a complete article in every Constitution.”53 
The framers of the California Constitution wished to endow the right to 
education with constitutional force, and did so in both the 1849 and 1879 
versions. 
3. The Holmes Amendment 
The framers’ robust language in adopting the constitutional 
provision, as well as their references to similarly strong provisions in 
other states, is persuasive evidence that the framers intended the 
education clause to incorporate a qualitative element. There was debate, 
however, on one proposed amendment that would have contained the 
words “thorough and efficient” in describing the education required 
under the constitution. But its rejection did not signal a rejection of a 
 
 50. As originally adopted, article IX, section 6 defining public schools “provided that all State 
school funds be used exclusively for the support of primary and grammar schools,” and the 1902 
amendment “authorized the legislators to vote a special State school tax . . . .” Cloud, supra note 34, 
at 103.  
 51. 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1087; see also Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 40 (Cal. 1984) 
(quoting Winans’s remarks during the 1879 debates and proceedings). 
 52. 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1087. 
 53. Id. 
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qualitative mandate, as some have suggested.54 This same amendment 
would have limited article IX to the “common schools.”55 The convention 
rejected this amendment, preferring to leave the opportunity for the 
legislature to provide for higher education. 
Samuel A. Holmes, a critic of advanced education, moved to 
eliminate the language in section 1 promoting “intellectual, scientific, 
moral, and agricultural improvement” by emphasizing simply the system 
of “common schools.”56 Holmes advocated striking section 1 and 
replacing it with: “The Legislature shall provide a thorough and efficient 
system of free schools, whereby all the children of this State may receive 
a good common school education.”57 As delegate Charles W. Cross58 
emphasized during the debate, “[t]his amendment proposes the 
education merely of children.”59 
Cross characterized the debate over the amendment as representing 
two polarized views of the framers: first, those who wanted funding for 
education “beyond a certain point, that certain point being an education 
in what is usually termed the common English branches,” and those who 
believed that “the education of a few to a high grade at the expense of 
the State finally proves a benefit to the State, far exceeding the expense 
of that much education.”60 He says, “I think [Holmes] will not take issue 
with me on this, that this is the point at which we are to determine . . . 
whether the State, in its appropriation of public funds, is to be limited to 
a common school system.”61 Delegate William F. White, a supporter of 
the amendment, also framed the debate as “common” school versus 
higher education: “We are now planning for a system of common school 
education, and if we want another system we must add it on afterward.”62 
Indeed, this was the urging of Cross, who was in favor of section 1 as it 
stood: 
 
 54. See Brief for Respondent at 9, Campaign for Quality Educ. v. California, No. A134423 (Cal. 
App. Oct. 19, 2012) (“[T]he framers specifically considered and rejected a proposal to impose 
qualitative requirements on the Legislature’s support for education . . . .”). 
 55. John Dinan, The Meaning of State Constitutional Education Clauses: Evidence from the 
Constitutional Convention Debates, 70 Alb. L. Rev. 927, 951 (2007); see also 1879 Debates, supra note 
35, at 1087. 
 56. Dinan, supra note 55, at 951. 
 57. 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1087. 
 58. Cross was an attorney from Nevada County. Cloud, supra note 34, at 69. 
 59. 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1087. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1088. 
 62. Id. 
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[S]o that whenever the people of this State shall feel like encouraging a 
higher intellectual development, they shall have the power to do so. 
But if, at any future time in the history of the State, the people wish to 
say that the expenditure should be limited to the common school 
branches, then, sir, the State should have the power to so limit it.63 
The Holmes Amendment failed. Rather than evincing a debate 
between whether schools should be “efficient,” “thorough,” or “good,” 
however, or showing that the framers considered and explicitly rejected a 
qualitative element to education, this debate instead highlights the 
framers’ disagreement over whether the constitution should mandate 
only a “common” (grade-level) education, or whether the guarantee 
extends to higher education. This, not a discussion of whether California 
schools should deliver a quality education, was the crux of the debate. 
4. The Debate over Section 1 
There was also a larger debate over the legal force of section 1, even 
apart from the Holmes Amendment. Although some delegates found the 
language lofty and imprecise, others maintained that it contained the 
force of law. Ultimately the language about intellectual, scientific, moral, 
and agricultural improvement endured, including requiring the 
legislature to create the school system.64 
Four delegates dismissed section 1 as merely hortatory. Joseph A. 
Filcher remarked that he was opposed to it “simply because there is 
nothing in it.”65 Other delegates felt the same way, including Dennis W. 
Herrington, who said the section is “meaningless,”66 and Winans, who 
stated it is “but a declaration of principle . . . general in its character.”67 
Delegate Thomas H. Laine called section 1 a “glittering generality.”68 
Three more delegates, however, argued that the provision contained 
the force of law. John T. Wickes69 argued that the section was not 
toothless, saying, “I do not care whether it is called a preamble or not. I 
take a Constitution to be a philosophic and historic as well as a legal 
instrument.”70 Delegates E.O. Smith and Lucius D. Morse, felt the same, 
with Smith remarking:  
I am of the same opinion as Dr. Morse, and I am of the opinion that it 
means something, too. It provides that it shall be the duty—that the 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Cal. Const. art. I, § 26 (“The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.”); Woodbury v. Brown-
Dempsey, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 124, 134–36 (2003).  
 65. 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1087. 
 66. Id. at 1089. 
 67. Id. at 1087. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Wickes was a teacher from Nevada County. Cloud, supra note 34, at 69. 
 70. 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1088. 
F - Gordon_18 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016 1:36 PM 
336 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:323 
Legislature shall encourage, by all suitable means, a promotion of 
intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement. This makes 
it the duty of the Legislature to forward this matter in every way that the 
Legislature may have the power to do.71 
5. Interpreting the Constitutional Debates 
It is difficult to separate the debate over section 1 from its context, 
namely the debate over Holmes’s Amendment limiting state-funded 
education to the “common” subjects. Some have argued that section 1 
represents a comparatively weak education provision because that 
section itself lacks a legislative mandate.72 When combined with the 
mandatory language of section 5, however, California’s provision starts 
to look much more like those in states whose courts have found an 
adequacy requirement in their constitutions. The far-reaching language 
remains in the constitution to this day, commanding the legislature to 
establish a system of common schools in order to promote intellectual, 
scientific, and moral improvement.73 Those looking to discern the true 
intentions of the constitution’s authors and give them effect must find 
that the framers placed paramount importance on establishing a system 
of schools, which was essential to developing a stable economy, an 
upwardly mobile populace, and the people’s ability to govern themselves.74 
From the framers’ debates, one can see California’s founders were 
concerned primarily with the citizenship aspects of a good education, 
emphasizing the necessity of being able to participate in the political life 
of the state. The qualitative mandate inherent in these goals is clear. 
C. The Cases 
The seminal California education cases are explicit in relying on the 
Equal Protection Clause. But underlying these cases are two unavoidable 
conclusions: first, that the constitution endows children with a right to 
education, and second, that this right means a right to a quality 
education. In recent years, scholars have begun to examine the theories 
of equal protection and adequacy in tandem, noting that they often 
converge in plaintiffs’ complaints and eventual court decisions in a 
national context.75 The following analysis shows that the California 
 
 71. Id. at 1089. 
 72. See, e.g., Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 
28 Harv. J. on Legis. 307, 337 (1991). 
 73. See Cal. Const. art. I, § 26 (“The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.”); Woodbury v. Brown-
Dempsey, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 124, 134–36 (2003). 
 74. See 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1089. 
 75. See, e.g., Robert M. Jensen, Advancing Education Through Education Clauses of State 
Constitutions, 1997 BYU Educ. & L.J. 1, 27 (1997) (describing “hybrid” equality-adequacy lawsuits as 
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Supreme Court has been taking this hybrid approach for years, using the 
language (and the practical underpinnings) of adequacy even in 
discussions that explicitly focus on equal protection or other constitutional 
guarantees. Through discussions about the purposes of a common school 
education, the importance of education to the state, or comparing 
various school attributes, the supreme court has implicitly recognized the 
basic, logical conclusion that schools must be more than school buildings. 
1. Two Early Cases (Pre-1971): School Access by Minorities 
Throughout its history, the California Supreme Court has been 
unwavering in its support of public education as a gateway to independence 
and democracy and as a catalyst to economic success. Even as it upheld 
separate-but-equal schooling, the court in 1874 held that the quality of a 
school was a key element in the constitutional right. In Ward v. Flood, 
the court considered whether an African American child could force a 
White school to admit her, finding that because the Black school was of 
equal quality to the White school, the right was fulfilled with separate-
but-equal schools.76 
The court’s reasoning had three parts. First, the court established 
the constitutional right to education.77 It held that the benefit of 
attending a public school is “secured to it under the highest sanction of 
positive law,” namely “in obedience to the special command of the 
Constitution.”78 The court found that the right to an education, having 
been mandated by the constitution, “is, therefore, a righta legal 
rightas distinctively so as the vested right in property owned is a legal 
right, and as such it is protected, and entitled to be protected by all the 
guarantees by which other legal rights are protected and secured to the 
possessor.”79 This right, the court reasoned, must be made available to 
all.80 
Next, the court discussed the purpose of the schools, namely the 
“improvement of [a child’s] mind and the elevation of his moral 
condition,” in the “recognized interest of society and of the body politic 
in the education of its members.”81 This language sounds remarkably 
similar to language contained section 1 of article IX, which was enshrined 
five years later in the 1879 constitution. 
 
“using the language of equality as ‘just one measure of adequacy’ to advance the quality of 
education”); Joshua E. Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 477, 480 (2014). 
 76. 48 Cal. 36 (1874). 
 77. Id. at 50. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 51. 
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Finally, the court found that separating the races was justified, 
because the Black school “afford[ed] equal advantages,” was taught by 
“able and efficient teachers,” and was administered “under the same 
rules and regulations” as the White school.82 That is, because the school 
was of equal quality, forcing Black students into segregated schools did 
not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Although its Fourteenth Amendment analysis was eventually 
repudiated by Brown v. Board of Education,83 the Ward court’s 
discussion of the right to an education remains sound, particularly in its 
recognition that the right is inexorably tied to its quality. The court could 
have said that the existence of a Black school was enough to fulfill the 
right, but it did not—it emphasized the quality of the Black school’s 
education in safeguarding the right.84 
Fifty years later, the court again found that the right to an education 
of a certain quality, not simply an education, was critical to fulfillment of 
the right. In Piper v. Big Pine School District of Inyo County, the court 
considered the case of a Native American student who wished to be 
admitted to a White school instead of being forced into a federal, native 
school.85 The court found that because the federal school was not 
supervised by the state board of education, and therefore had no 
guarantee of quality, efficiency, or value, such a school would not be the 
fulfillment of the right under the California Constitution.86 
The court first held that because the state had no control over the 
efficiency and quality of a federal school, there was no way to measure 
whether the requirements of article IX had been met.87 The court found 
that “[t]he public school system of this state is a product of the studied 
thought of the eminent educators of this and other states of the Union, 
perfected by years of trial and experience,” describing each grade 
“form[ing] a working unit in a uniform, comprehensive plan of education.”88 
The court then reaffirmed the right under the constitution, and its 
critical importance to the state:  
[T]he common schools are doorways opening into chambers of science, 
art, and the learned professions, as well as into fields of industrial and 
commercial activities. Opportunities for securing employment are 
often more or less dependent upon the rating which a youth, as a pupil 
of our public institutions, has received in his school work. These are 
rights and privileges that cannot be denied.89 
 
 82. Id. at 45, 55–57. 
 83. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 84. Ward, 48 Cal. at 55–57. 
 85. 226 P. 926 (Cal. 1924). 
 86. Id. at 930. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
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The court found that the advantages of school “cannot be enjoyed 
as a matter of right by those who, from choice or compulsion, attend 
schools without the control, supervision, and regulation of the educational 
departments of the state,” that is, without regulations on what and how 
children are taught.90 
In a final note, the court dismissed the local school district’s concern 
about the cost of educating Native American children. It found that the 
courts were not responsible for this cost, and that the “economic question 
is no doubt an important matter to the district, but it may very properly be 
addressed to the legislative department of the state government.”91 
These early cases show that evaluating the quality of a school, 
through indicators such as quality teachers, efficient administration, and 
government oversight, is critical to evaluating whether that school is 
fulfilling the article IX right. The mere availability of a school, especially a 
school with questionable quality, is not sufficient to safeguard the 
constitutional guarantee. 
2. Serrano v. Priest (1971): “More than Access to a Classroom” 
In Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), the court held for the first time that 
a school financing scheme was subject to strict scrutiny.92 There, plaintiffs 
challenged the state’s school finance scheme that conditioned school 
funding on local property taxes.93 The court held that strict scrutiny was 
warranted both because education is a fundamental right, and because it 
was being apportioned unequally, in violation of the constitution’s Equal 
Protection Clause.94 
Reading this case as addressing only equality, however, ignores the 
court’s strong language about the importance of education to both the 
individual and society, critical to everything from economic development 
to political participation. Recognizing the “distinctive and priceless 
function of education in our society,” it held that education is a 
fundamental right under the California Constitution.95 An unequal 
apportionment of funds, it held, infringed this right in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
Although the bulk of the court’s rights analysis was devoted to equal 
protection, the ruling was based again on assumptions about school 
quality. The unconstitutionality of the finance scheme was rooted in the 
 
 90. Id. at 928. 
 91. Id. at 930. 
 92. 487 P.2d 1241, 1249 (Cal. 1971). 
 93. Id. at 1244. 
 94. Id. at 1249. Strict scrutiny review in this context requires the state to establish not only that it 
has a compelling interest that justifies a given law, but that the distinctions drawn by the law are 
necessary to further that compelling interest.  
 95. Id. at 1258. 
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fact that it “classifie[d] its recipients on the basis of their collective 
affluence and ma[de] the quality of a child’s education depend upon the 
resources of his school district and ultimately upon the pocketbook of his 
parents.”96 Because students in poorer districts received a different (and 
presumably poorer) quality of education, and because no compelling 
state interest justified this, the state’s funding scheme failed the strict 
scrutiny test.97 Later, in Serrano II, the court discussed quality at length, 
indicating that some of the marks of educational quality include “higher 
quality staff, program expansion and variety, beneficial teacher to pupil 
ratios and class sizes, modern equipment and materials, and high-quality 
buildings.”98 
Imputing a right to a quality education is the only logical conclusion 
from this case. It is highly unlikely that, finding education to be a 
fundamental right critical to both individual development and the economic 
and political health of the state, the court could find no required minimum 
quality for such education. The court emphasized the phrase “all the 
benefits and detriments that a child may receive from his educational 
experience,” even condoning the use of “pupil output as a measure of the 
quality of a district’s educational program.”99 Here, too, although the case 
was at its heart about unequal spending, that fact cannot be divorced from 
the result of the unequal spending at issue: an unequal apportionment of 
educational quality. Although the court did not explicitly consider what 
quality of education was required in order to reap the “full enjoyment” 
of the right, it signaled that “surely the right to an education today means 
more than access to a classroom.”100 
3. Butt v. State (1992): What Falls Below the Bar? 
In 1991, the Richmond Unified School District announced it would 
end the school year six weeks earlier than its scheduled release date, due 
to a lack of funds.101 Richmond parents filed for an injunction alleging 
that the loss of six weeks of instruction would cause “serious, irreparable 
harm to the District’s 31,500 students and would deny them their 
‘fundamental right to an effective public education’ under the California 
Constitution.”102 The case reached the California Supreme Court, which 
emphasized that although local control of schools is a tenet of the 
California system, the court will intervene where the actual quality of the 
district’s program, viewed as a whole, “falls fundamentally below 
 
 96. Id. at 1263 (emphasis added). 
 97. Id.  
 98. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 939 (Cal. 1976). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1257. 
 101. Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Cal. 1992). 
 102. Id. at 1244. 
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prevailing statewide standards.”103 The court’s decision was based in part 
on the declarations of “[s]everal District teachers” who outlined the 
effects of the closure in the classrooms, including preventing high school 
seniors from receiving “intended lessons covering the State’s executive 
and judicial branches” and qualifying for college admission; “Algebra I 
students would miss essential instruction in quadratic equations”; first 
graders would miss instruction in “phonics, reading comprehension, 
creative writing, handwriting skills,” and so on.104 The court upheld the 
trial court’s finding that the “proposed closure would have a real and 
appreciable impact on the affected students’ fundamental California 
right to basic educational equality.”105 
Here again, the case was ostensibly about equal access to the 
fundamental right to an education. Equality of education, however, was 
not truly the issue; this was not an attempt to equalize schools. Indeed, 
the court observed that: “[A] requirement that [the State] provide 
[strictly] ‘equal’ educational opportunities would thus seem to present an 
entirely unworkable standard requiring impossible measurements and 
comparisons.”106 The court explicitly found that the California Constitution 
does not guarantee uniform “local programs, philosophies, and conditions,” 
including term lengths.107 
According to the California Supreme Court, “basic educational 
equality” was critical.108 The court did not define what this meant, but 
what could the addition of the word “basic” mean other than a minimum 
level of educational quality? The court, with the addition of this word, 
essentially ruled on what a basic education under the California 
Constitution requires: a basic minimal level of educational quality. The 
decision was not based on funding; the Richmond School District received 
a constitutional level of funding under the state finance scheme. It was 
not based on pure equality; the court accepted that local control will 
ensure some variation in schools. It was also not based on disobeying the 
explicit mandates of the constitution: the school was free, and was longer 
than the constitutionally minimum six-month requirement. The text of 
the constitution requires only six months of school,109 and indeed, the 
state argued that six months was all that was required.110 The court 
rejected this contention.111 
 
 103. Id. at 1252. 
 104. Id. at 1253, 1253 n.16. 
 105. Id. at 1253. 
 106. Id. at 1252 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198 (1982)). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1253. 
 109. Cal. Const. art. IX, § 5. 
 110. Butt, 842 P.2d at 1247. 
 111. Id. 
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The decision therefore rested on the idea that a “basic” education, 
one that meets the requirements of the education article, was one that 
met “prevailing statewide standards.”112 The court in Butt showed that it 
was willing to guarantee a minimum level of schooling for students, 
based on the standards, and that it was prepared to ensure that the state 
could intervene when a district fails to fulfill its constitutional mandate. 
4. Hartzell v. Connell (1984): When a Free School Is Not Free 
In Hartzell v. Connell, taxpayers in the Santa Barbara High School 
District challenged fees charged by the district for participation in 
extracurricular activities, arguing the fees violated the “free school” and 
equal protection guarantees of the state constitution.113 Defendants 
argued that the fundamental right to an “education” guaranteed 
“nothing more than an opportunity to progress from grade to grade and 
receive a diploma,” regardless of the programs’ actual educational 
value.114 The court rejected this contention, finding that because 
extracurricular activities constitute “a fundamental ingredient of the 
educational process” they therefore must be offered free of charge.115 
Here again, the court looked beyond the simple provision of an education, 
instead discussing how the features and quality of a district’s program 
contribute to the letter and spirit of the constitutional guarantee. 
In rejecting the notion that the purpose of an education can be 
divorced from its provision, the court talked at length about the purposes 
of a quality public education, drawing on sources from Thomas Jefferson 
to Serrano I.116 The court specifically called out the role that a “high 
quality” education plays in participating in the political process.117 The 
court rejected the idea that guaranteeing only the classes offered for 
credit fulfilled the free schools mandate, saying this would “sever the 
concept of education from its purposes.”118 These purposes, according to 
the court, included “the making of good citizens physically, mentally, and 
morally,”119 which are “directly linked to the constitutional role of 
education in preserving democracy, as set forth in article IX, section 1.”120 
The court, in other words, rejected the notion of an empty grade-
progression education, looked deeply into the purpose of education, 
 
 112. Id. at 1252. 
 113. 679 P.2d 35, 37 (Cal. 1984). 
 114. Id. at 50 (Bird, J., concurring). 
 115. Id. at 42. 
 116. Id. at 40–41. 
 117. Id. at 41. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 42. 
 120. Id. at 43. 
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cited the need for “high quality” in making good citizens, and found that 
the right is fulfilled only where all aspects of the right are provided free. 
Interestingly, the equal protection cause of action was not discussed 
in the primary opinion of the court. The court based its decision only on 
the “free schools” guarantee of article IX, section 5: “The Legislature 
shall provide for a system of common schools by which a free school shall 
be kept up and supported in each district . . . .” This shows that the court 
has not confined its rulings to equal protection jurisprudence where a 
basic constitutional guarantee remains unfulfilled. 
II.  Equality v. Adequacy Analysis 
As discussed above, notions of quality and adequacy have long been 
the foundation of the California Supreme Court’s education jurisprudence, 
even where the decision was ostensibly based on equal protection. This is 
for good reason. Although equal protection surely played a critical part 
in Serrano I, Serrano II, and other groundbreaking decisions, there are 
limitations to this doctrine in defining and fulfilling the constitutional 
right, both doctrinally and practically.  
Doctrinally, there are three primary problems with viewing 
education solely in an equal protection context. First, confining 
education to an equality-based definition ignores the text and history of 
the constitutional provision requiring an education for all children, not 
simply an equal education. Second, equal protection does little to solve 
the underlying question of what the right entails. It is simply necessary to 
consider what the right means in the first place in order to determine 
what elements of that right must be apportioned equally to achieve 
equality. The court has avoided the question by using the phrase “basic 
educational equality” from Butt, implying some kind of baseline, but 
never defining it. Without a definition, the court is left with the 
piecemeal, case-by-case approach we see today. Finally, equal protection 
is a misnomer; in addition to being an unattainable goal, true educational 
equality, that is, making all schools equal, has never been the goal of 
education litigation. Nor does it alleviate the possibility of “basically 
equal” but grossly inadequate schools, something that the court (and the 
framers) would surely find problematic. 
Practically, equal protection doctrine also has its limitations. 
Education has been a fundamental right in California for more than forty 
years, yet California schools are currently ranked tenth lowest in the 
nation.121 Only about half of schoolchildren pass even the state’s own 
 
 121. Dan Walters, California Schools Rank Low—Again—in Education Week Report, Sacramento 
Bee (Jan. 10, 2014, 12:25 PM), http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2014/01/california-schools-
rank-low---again---in-education-week-report.html. 
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standards.122 There is great variation in students’ passage rates even 
within demographic and economic categories, where the equal protection 
doctrine does not tread. More must be done to realize the framers’ vision 
of “extend[ing] the blessings of education throughout the land, and 
secur[ing] its advantages to the present and future generations.”123 
A. Equal Protection Cannot Define the Right Without Article IX. 
First, viewing the right to education solely as an equal protection 
problem ignores the text and history of the constitutional provision, 
requiring an education for all children, not simply an equal education. As 
Justice Marshall put it in his dissent in San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez: “The Equal Protection Clause is not addressed to 
the minimal sufficiency but rather to the unjustifiable inequalities of state 
action. It mandates nothing less than that ‘all persons similarly 
circumstanced shall be treated alike.’”124 
In the California Constitution, equal protection has its own 
provision, in article I, section 7, separate from article IX’s education 
provision. Confining the discussion of article IX only to article I 
protections does not give due regard to the specific mandates contained 
in the education article, and ignores the explicit and robust constitutional 
provision requiring the legislature to establish schools and the goals of 
doing so. If education is a fundamental right for equal protection 
purposes, education must also be a fundamental right for its own 
purposes. 
Further, requiring equality but not quality ignores the framers’ 
intent to educate the children of California. As noted by the Hartzell court, 
Winans, chairperson for the convention’s Committee on Education, called 
public education “the basis of self-government and [] the very corner 
stone of republican institutions.”125 Other framers’ remarks were similarly 
forceful in stating the importance of education.126 The framers intended to 
enshrine a constitutional provision representing the inherent good of an 
education to California, not simply the value of providing a service on an 
equal basis. 
Equal protection also does nothing to define the right itself. After 
Serrano, it is clear that education is a fundamental right and that 
disparate treatment is worthy of strict scrutiny, but still no decision has 
defined what the right means beyond “more than access to a 
 
 122. See Standardized Testing and Reporting (STAR) Results, Cal. Dep’t Educ., http://star.cde.ca.gov/ 
(last updated July 24, 2014). 
 123. 1849 Debates, supra note 45, at 474. 
 124. 411 U.S. 1, 89 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). 
 125. Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 40 (Cal. 1984) (quoting 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1102). 
 126. See infra Part II.B.1. 
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classroom.”127 Butt did little to clarify it, by demanding only “basic 
educational equality” and “basic equality of educational opportunity.”128 
Even these terms obscure more than they clarify: it is unclear which noun 
the adjective “basic” is meant to qualify.129 It also “remains unclear 
whether this basic equity means equality of basic educational inputs, 
basic equality in educational outcomes, basic equality of educational 
inputs, basic equality to achieve a certain educational outcome, or some 
other standard not yet enunciated.”130 Indeed, “even identical services 
and facilities will not afford an equal educational opportunity to students 
who come to school with sharply different needs and abilities.”131 
Without these definitions and markers, it is impossible to determine 
whether one district’s offering is equal in the relevant sense to another’s. 
Without a definition, litigants and lower courts are left without guidance 
to evaluate whether districts’ teacher layoff plans,132 provision of 
educational materials,133 and school fees,134 as well as counties’ applications 
of state property taxes135 and students’ time spent in the classroom136 
conform with the mandate of equal protection under the law. 
Finally, equality does not alleviate the problem of “basically equal” 
but grossly inadequate schools. The California Supreme Court addressed 
and disallowed this possibility in Serrano I with its admonition that “surely 
the right to an education today means more than access to a classroom.”137 
As the Kentucky Supreme Court stated in its groundbreaking opinion 
requiring educational adequacy: “We reject [] a definition which could 
result in a system of common schools, efficient only in the uniformly 
deplorable conditions it provides throughout the state.”138 Yet without 
 
 127. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1257 (Cal. 1971). 
 128. Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1251 (Cal. 1992). 
 129. “Basic equality” could mean “forming an essential foundation or starting point” of equality, 
which would seemingly mandate fundamental, nonnegotiable equality across programs. It could also 
mean, however, “offering or consisting of the minimum required without elaboration or luxury; 
simplest or lowest in level” of educational opportunity, mandating only a floor of educational equality, 
beyond which districts are free to vary by providing more or better services once this baseline has been 
reached. It could also mean, however, that all programs must be roughly equalone program must be 
“basically equal” to another. 
 130. William S. Koski, Achieving “Adequacy” in the Classroom, 27 B.C. Third World L.J. 13, 38 
(2007). 
 131. Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 Vand. 
L. Rev. 101, 150 (1995). 
 132. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Final Approval of Settlement, 
Reed v. State, No. BC432420, 2011 WL 10893745, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 18–21, 2011). 
 133. See D.J. v. State, No. BS142775, 2014 WL 4064226, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 24, 2014). 
 134. Complaint at 1, Doe v. California, No. BC445151 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2010).  
 135. See Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 4–6, 
California Dep’t of Fin. v. Grimes, No. 30-2012-00559592 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 2012).  
 136. Complaint at 1–8, Cruz v. California, No. 14727139 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 29, 2014). 
 137. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1257 (Cal. 1971). 
 138. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989). 
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guidance on what more is required, or indeed if anything is required at 
all, equal schools full of children without basic competency in learning 
fundamentals are a very real possibility, and indeed may already exist. As 
a number of scholars have noted, “[t]here is nothing in [an equal 
protection analysis] . . . that would prevent the state of California, in 
meeting its constitutional mandate,” from “equally” failing to fund the 
entire education system, for example establishing only one school in each 
school district.139 While it may be difficult to envision a state withdrawing 
all support for education, there is nothing in the equal protection analysis 
that would prevent it from doing so.140 Thus, the schools’ guarantee must 
lie in article IX, not simply the equal protection clause. 
B. Equal Protection Is Infeasible and Undesirable. 
True equality in education is infeasible and undesirable in light of 
the large variations in educational priorities, disparities in resources, and 
the longstanding principle of local control. Although equality is 
appealing in its simplicity, in reality no two educational programs will 
ever be truly equal. This is true for a number of reasons. First, true 
equality would be enormously complex, if not impossible, to prove and 
administer. In the context of education, hundreds of different inputs, 
from the training of teachers to the competence of administrators to the 
quality of textbooks to the size of a classroom, all affect how a district or 
school delivers education; it would be quite simply impossible to equalize 
all these factors.  
Even considering only school funding, the appropriate dimension 
for comparison has proven elusive despite decades of litigation.141 As we 
have seen, equalizing funding does not create equal programs, as 
“[e]qual expenditures may fail to produce equal schools because of 
variations, for example, in [the] efficiency of administration, in resource 
allocation decisions, or in the demands placed on schools by their 
different student populations.”142 Particularly in California, with marked 
differences in cost of living, property tax bases, and demographics, the 
same dollar can produce vastly different marginal increases in a child’s 
education.143 Some even argue that money is not linked to the quality of 
educational outputs at all, and equal funding will not produce anything 
 
 139. See John C. Eastman, When Did Education Become a Civil Right? An Assessment of State 
Constitutional Provisions for Education 1776–1900, 42 Am. J. Legal Hist. 1, 30 (1998); see also Scott 
R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of Educational Adequacy and the 
Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 701, 701 (2010); R. Craig Wood, 
Constitutional Challenges to State Education Finance Distribution Formulas: Moving from Equity to 
Adequacy, 23 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 531, 551 (2004). 
 140. See Eastman, supra note 139, at 33–34. 
 141. See Enrich, supra note 131, at 145; McUsic, supra note 72, at 316. 
 142. Enrich, supra note 131, at 148. 
 143. See McUsic, supra note 72, at 330 (detailing why education costs differ across school districts). 
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resembling an equal education.144 This is a serious problem because 
plaintiffs in school finance cases “do not seek equal funding merely for 
the sake of equality; they seek to improve the educational opportunities 
offered by their schools.”145 
Educational equality is also a politically infeasible goal. California’s 
legislature has emphasized local control of schools;146 this local control 
will necessarily bring variation. Again turning to the area of funding, 
wealthier districts have a vested interested in protecting their ability to 
spend more money to provide their children with a superior education.147 
A significant fear exists that in order to achieve equality, the wealthier 
districts will either need to restrict their spending or services, or pay for 
the poorer districts out of their own funds.148 It also “threatens the wealthy 
districts’ ability to give their children an advantage in the competition for 
post-school opportunities,” for which they are willing to spend a great 
deal of their own wealth.149 It would likely be impossible to disallow this 
spending, but equally impossible to bring every school district in the state 
up to the spending levels of the wealthiest districts.150 
Moreover, simply equalizing per-pupil funding might not produce 
better educational opportunities for disadvantaged children because 
education costs for these children are higher than the costs for other 
 
 144. Aaron Saiger, Note, Disestablishing Local School Districts as a Remedy for Educational 
Inadequacy, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1830, 1837–38 (1999) (citing Eric A. Hanushek, Conclusions and 
Controversies About the Effectiveness of School Resources, 4 Fed. Res. Bank N.Y. Econ. Pol’y Rev. 
11, 22 (1998) (“Simply providing more funding or a different distribution of funding [to schools] is 
unlikely to improve student achievement . . . .”). 
 145. Noreen O’Grady, Toward a Thorough and Efficient Education: Resurrecting the Pennsylvania 
Education Clause, 67 Temp. L. Rev. 613, 631 (1994) (citing Richard J. Stark, Education Reform: 
Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutions’ Education Finance Provisions—Adequacy vs. Equality, 
1991 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 609, 613–14). 
 146. Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1254 (Cal. 1992) (quoting Cal. Const. art. IX, §§ 6 1/2, 14). 
 147. Enrich, supra note 131, at 156. 
 148. See id. at 156–57; Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 
2417, 2439 (2004) (“Local citizens, especially parents, do not like to be told that they cannot raise and 
spend local revenues on their own schools. Many like even less the idea that their locally raised 
revenues might be redirected to schools throughout the rest of the state.”); McUsic, supra note 72, at 
328–29 (“In the past the legislative response to court-ordered school finance reform has been 
inadequate, in part, because property rich districts have ‘impede[d] the efforts of the poorer districts’ 
citizens to secure a satisfactory legislative remedy,’” in part because of the threat of wealth transfer 
from rich to poor districts.). 
 149. Enrich, supra note 131, at 158; see also Rob Reich, Not Very Giving, N.Y. Times (Sept. 4, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/opinion/not-very-giving.html (describing how the town of 
Hillsborough on the San Francisco peninsula raised an additional $2300 per pupil in 2012 through 
private contributions, compared to Oakland and San Francisco district foundations, which raised less 
than $100 extra per child).  
 150. See William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard Questions Posed by Rodriguez: Ending the 
Separation of School Finance and Educational Policy by Bridging the Gap Between Wrong and 
Remedy, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 721, 754 (1992). 
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children.151 For example, “students with low English proficiency or little 
[family] support . . . require more . . . education[al services] . . . to reach 
the same achievement level as [more advantaged students].”152 These 
variations in education costs to reach equal achievement further 
demonstrate the infeasibility of evaluating education under an equal 
protection framework. 
C. Adequacy More Appropriately Addresses Societal Goals. 
Focusing on adequacy has a number of benefits. Among other 
benefits, the adequacy approach is “grounded in broadly shared societal 
values concerning the importance of education and the obligation to provide 
for the basic needs of society’s least advantaged.”153 
Adequacy is appealing because it does not threaten to lower the 
level of achievement or spending in some districts in an effort to create 
equality.154 Indeed, some equal protection cases, such as Abbott v. Burke II155 
in New Jersey, specifically brought about the kind of wealth distribution not 
required by an adequacy approach.156 An adequacy analysis does not 
necessitate defining and comparing different groups within the system; it 
therefore does not require redistribution.157 
Adequacy also addresses the societal goal of equity.158 In states 
where plaintiffs in adequacy cases have won, the court has defined an 
“adequate” education as “sufficient to prepare all students, no matter 
their starting points, to compete equally in the world.”159 This language 
“shows adequacy suits’ intent to reach equity.”160 Adequacy is even 
better than equal protection in achieving equity because it can create 
systems where disparities are diminished by giving more to students who 
need more; “equality can only make things even.”161 For example, a true 
 
 151. Heise, supra note 148, at 2441 (noting that equity-based litigation disfavors urban districts 
with high per-pupil funding levels); Stark, supra note 145, at 657 (“To compensate for the effects of 
poverty . . . poor children required greater educational resources than affluent children.”). 
 152. McUsic, supra note 72, at 329; see also id. at 330 (noting that urban districts must pay higher 
teacher salaries and higher site and construction costs). 
 153. Enrich, supra note 131, at 170. 
 154. Id.; McUsic, supra note 72, at 328–29. 
 155. 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). 
 156. Phil Weiser, What’s Quality Got to Do with It?: Constitutional Theory, Politics, and Education 
Reform, 21 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 745, 774 (1995) (responding to litigation with “targeted aid 
to an additional two school districts and capped the spending of wealthier districts in order to realize 
greater distributional equity”). 
 157. Id. at 758. 
 158. Meaghan Field, Justice as Fairness: The Equitable Foundations of Adequacy Litigation, 
12 Scholar 403, 407 (2010). 
 159. Id. at 410 (citing Deborah A. Verstegen, Towards a Theory of Adequacy: The Continuing 
Saga of Equal Educational Opportunity in the Context of State Constitutional Challenges to School 
Finance Systems, 23 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 499, 508, 51112, 523 (2004)). 
 160. Id.  
 161. Field, supra note 158, at 410 n.29. 
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equity-based analysis could give $5000 to every child in the state, and 
likely pass a constitutional equity challenge, whether or not some 
students actually need $7000 in order to achieve basic literacy and 
numeracy given their learning needs. Adequacy’s true concern is equality 
of opportunity, not equality of resources (even if that is facially what the 
claim asks for) because the resources consist of what each student needs 
to reach the state-imposed standards, even if those needs differ 
immensely.162 A truly adequate education may in fact demand something 
other than equal resources.163 
D. Adequacy Is the Only Way to Guarantee the Right. 
Without a right to a quality education, the right to education is 
hollow. The right to counsel is a useful comparison. Article I, section 15 
of the California Constitution guarantees a right to counsel.164 As both 
the U.S. and the California Supreme Court have found, this right to 
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.165 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has found that the right to a fair trial is contained not 
only in the Due Process Clauses, but independently through the right to 
counsel in the Sixth Amendment.166 The Supreme Court has also affirmed 
that this right is not conditioned on wealth.167 The right to counsel, 
however, is not satisfied simply if a “lawyer is present at trial alongside 
the accused.”168 The constitutional mandate is fulfilled only where 
counsel renders “adequate legal assistance.”169 
Similarly, article IX of the California Constitution guarantees a right 
to education.170 As this Article argues, this right is guaranteed not only by 
the equal protection clause, but independently through the education 
clause itself. The California Supreme Court has also found that the right 
to an education cannot be conditioned on wealth.171 Finally, the right to 
an education is not satisfied simply by “access to a classroom.”172 
The parallels between the right to adequate counsel and a right to 
adequate education have not gone unnoticed by the California Supreme 
Court; the court compared the two in its first Serrano decision, and even 
 
 162. Id. at 410–11. 
 163. Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Financing Adequate Educational Opportunity, 14 J.L. & Pol. 483, 
500 (1998). 
 164. Cal. Const. art. I, § 15. 
 165. In re Valdez, 233 P.3d 1049, 1059 (Cal. 2010) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
686 (1984)). 
 166. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684–85. 
 167. Id. at 685 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 686 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)). 
 170. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Cal. 1971). 
 171. Id. at 1257. 
 172. Id. 
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noted that “from a larger perspective, education may have far greater 
social significance” than the right to a fair trial.173 There are limits to 
trying to reproduce Sixth Amendment jurisprudence within the context 
of education (no one has ever been able to plead “ineffective assistance 
of teacher,” for example). Pointing out the parallels, however, serves to 
highlight that the supreme court has found that the only way to fulfill the 
right to counsel is to guarantee adequacy; it should do the same with the 
right to education. The court should not continue to affirm a 
fundamental right, as held in Serrano, while also finding that article IX 
holds no qualitative mandate. 
III.  Other States’ Courts 
Other states’ high courts have dealt with interpreting their 
education clauses, some substantially similar to California’s provisions. 
California courts may look to the decisions of other state courts that have 
interpreted similar constitutional provisions because where “words are 
used which are employed in a certain sense in the constitutions or 
statutes of other States . . . , it is proper to consider them as employed in 
the same sense in our Constitution.”174 The California Supreme Court has 
repeatedly looked to other states’ interpretations of similar provisions in 
their constitutions, particularly in the context of the free schools 
provision.175 Moreover, California’s constitutional framers explicitly 
stated that the language of the education clause was taken from other 
states’ constitutions.176 Because of this heavy borrowing, logic dictates 
that a clause that appears in all of the constitutions should be interpreted 
in a roughly uniform fashion.177 
Nearly every state’s education article contains language that 
resembles the language in the California Constitution. One category of 
cases adds words such as “thorough,” “complete,” and “efficient” to the 
establishment of a school system, but otherwise look similar to California’s 
own article.178 Another category resembles California’s article 9, section 1 
(regarding the promotion of intellectual and scientific goals), articulating 
goals beyond the simple establishment of schools.179 Still another 
 
 173. Id. at 1257–58. 
 174. See Cty. of Sacramento v. Hickman, 428 P.2d 593, 599 (Cal. 1967). 
 175. See Arcadia Unified Sch. Dist. v. State Dep’t of Educ., 825 P.2d 438, 443 (Cal. 1992); Hartzell v. 
Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 38–44 (Cal. 1984). 
 176. 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1087. 
 177. Noreen O’Grady, supra note 145, at 630 (citing McUsic, supra note 72, at 312). 
 178. See, e.g., Ark. Const. art. XIV, § 1; Colo. Const. art. IX, § 2; Idaho Const. art. IX, § 1; Ky. 
Const. § 183; N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1; Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2; S.D. Const. art. VIII, § 15; 
Tex. Const. art. VII, § 1; Wash. Const. art. IX, § 1; W. Va. Const. art. XII, § 1; Wyo. Const. art. VII, § 1. 
 179. See, e.g., Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2 (“Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused 
generally among the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and 
liberties; . . . it shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this 
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category looks like California’s article I, section 5: “The Legislature shall 
provide for a system of common schools by which a free school shall be 
kept up and supported in each district at least six months in every year, 
after the first year in which a school has been established.”180 
Because of these variations, there are limits to the utility of 
comparing other states’ provisions to that of California. First, it is 
difficult to compare other states’ provisions because of these variations, 
including the use of the terms “thorough,” “efficient,” or both. 
California’s article IX, section 5 states only: “The Legislature shall 
provide for a system of common schools by which a free school shall be 
kept up and supported in each district at least six months in every year, 
after the first year in which a school has been established.”181 
Second, California’s education rights doctrine does not easily 
compare to other states’ doctrines because in California, the supreme 
court has long held that education is a fundamental right.182 This right has 
not been so clearly established in every state. 
Despite these limitations, a review of other states’ decisions reveals 
that there is a movement in favor of finding a substantive, qualitative 
right to education under state constitutions. “The highest courts of at 
least fourteen states . . . have declared that education is a fundamental 
right under their state constitutions.”183 Twenty-two have held that there 
 
commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of 
them . . . .”); Mont. Const. art. X, § 1 (indicating that the legislature shall provide a basic system of 
free quality public elementary and secondary schools); N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII (substantially 
similar to Massachusetts’). 
 180. See, e.g., Ariz. Const. art. XI, § 1 (“The legislature shall enact such laws as shall provide for 
the establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school system.”); Conn. Const. 
art. VIII, § 1 (“There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state. The 
general assembly shall implement this principle by appropriate legislation.”); Kan. Const. art. VI, § 1 
(“The legislature shall provide for intellectual, educational, vocational and scientific improvement by 
establishing and maintaining public schools, educational institutions and related activities which may 
be organized and changed in such manner as may be provided by law.”); Minn. Const. art. XIII; § 1 
(“The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly upon the intelligence of the 
people, it shall be the duty of the legislature to establish a general and uniform system of public 
schools.”); N.C. Const. art. IX, §§ 1–2 (“Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good 
government and the happiness of mankind, schools, libraries, and the means of education shall forever 
be encouraged. . . . The General Assembly shall provide . . . for a general and uniform system of free 
public schools . . . .”); S.C. Const. art. XI, § 3 (“The General Assembly shall provide for the 
maintenance and support of a system of free public schools open to all children in the State and shall 
establish, organize and support such other public institutions of learning, as may be desirable.”); 
Vt. Const. ch. 2, § 68 (“[A] competent number of schools ought to be maintained in each town unless 
the general assembly permits other provisions for the convenient instruction of youth.”); Wis. Const. 
art. X, § 3 (“The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools.”). 
 181. Cal. Const. art. IX, § 5. 
 182. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1258 (Cal. 1971). 
 183. Ken Gormley, Education as a Fundamental Right: Building a New Paradigm, 2 F. on Pub. 
Pol’y 207, 219 n.63 (2006) (listing Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Kentucky, Minnesota, 
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming as 
declaring education a fundamental right). 
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is a substantive guarantee underlying their states’ education clauses, 
often where plaintiffs alleged inadequate funding.184 
In the minority of states that have declined to find a right to 
adequacy, their supreme courts have never found education to be a 
fundamental right.185 The Indiana and Rhode Island supreme courts, for 
example, rejected claims that their constitutional provisions required any 
kind of minimum adequate quality of schooling, but did so while finding 
no right to education at all.186 California, of course, has found a right to 
education.187 The conclusion from this review is that no supreme court 
has ever found its education clause to contain a substantive right to an 
education with no corresponding guarantee of quality. The flip side, 
curiously enough, has happened: the Montana Supreme Court refused to 
rule on whether its state’s constitution conferred a fundamental right to 
education, even while finding Montana’s school funding system 
unconstitutional.188 
What we learn from these cases is that only a minority of states have 
found that their education clauses confer no substantive right. Where a 
state’s high court has found a right to education, none has found that 
 
 184. Arizona: Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 823 (Ariz. 1994); 
Arkansas: Tucker v. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips Cty., 917 S.W.2d 530, 696 (Ark. 1996); 
Colorado: Lobato v. People, 218 P.3d 358, 374 (Colo. 2009) (en banc); Connecticut: Conn. Coal. for 
Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 233 (Conn. 2010); Idaho: Idaho Schs. for Equal 
Educ. Opportunity v. State, 976 P.2d 913, 914 (Idaho 1998); Kansas: Montoy v. State, 120 P.3d 306, 308 
(Kan. 2005); Kentucky: Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 194 (Ky. 1989); 
Massachusetts: McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 517 (Mass. 1993); Montana: 
Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 310 (Mont. 2005); New Hampshire: 
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1355 (N.H. 1997); New Jersey: Abbott v. Burke, 
575 A.2d 359, 405 (N.J. 1990); New York: Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 
331 (N.Y. 2003); North Carolina: Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997); Ohio: DeRolph v. 
State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ohio 1997); South Carolina: Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 
535, 540 (S.C. 1999); South Dakota: Davis v. State, 804 N.W.2d 618, 624 (S.D. 2011); Texas: Edgewood 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989); Vermont: Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 
390 (Vt. 1997); Wisconsin: Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 397 (Wis. 2000); Washington: Seattle 
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 85–86 (Wash. 1978); McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 23031 
(Wash. 2012); West Virginia: Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 870 (W.Va. 1979); Wyoming: Campbell 
Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1263 (Wyo. 1995). 
 185. Illinois: Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1195 (Ill. 1996) (same); Indiana: 
Bonner ex rel. Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 522 (Ind. 2009) (finding a duty for the legislature but 
no right or adequacy guarantee); Maryland: Hornbeck v. Somerset Cty. Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 
786 (Md. 1983); Nebraska: Nebraska Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 
164, 179 (Neb. 2007) (noting that voters had also rejected a 1996 constitutional amendment that would 
have ensured a “quality” education). 
 186. Bonner, 907 N.E.2d at 522 (finding that the constitution “does not speak in terms of a right or 
entitlement to education,” therefore no right under the constitution “to be educated to a certain 
quality or other output standard”); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 55 (R.I. 1995) (“The 
education clause confers no such right [to an education], nor does it guarantee an ‘equal, adequate, 
and meaningful education.’”). 
 187. See Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1248–49. 
 188. Columbia Falls, 109 P.3d at 261. 
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right to exist without a guarantee of quality. Decades ago, the California 
Supreme Court established a fundamental right to education in Serrano. 
To find that there is no corresponding adequacy guarantee would not 
only put California at odds with other states’ interpretations of their 
education clauses, it would render Serrano hollow.189 Unless the supreme 
court overrules Serrano, the continued viability of the right and its 
interaction with a right to an adequate education are inextricable. 
IV.  The Way Forward: Standards-Based Adequacy Evaluation 
Establishing the right to an adequate education, as this Article seeks 
to do, is far from the end of the inquiry. When deciding an education 
adequacy case, a court must take three steps: (1) defining the meaning of 
a constitutionally adequate education; (2) determining how to objectively 
measure whether a school system is adequate; and (3) deciding on a 
remedy.190 This Article does not purport to define the best way to apply 
this analysis; it seeks merely to prove the existence of the right and 
present a constitutionally-appropriate way to address questions about its 
substance. Part IV also aims to dismiss any separation of powers 
concerns.  
A. Separation of Powers Concerns 
In one adequacy-based case pending before the California Court of 
Appeal, the State alleges that any adequacy challenges under article IX 
are nonjusticiable intrusions upon the legislative domain.191 The 
argument is based on article IX’s instruction that the state legislature 
“shall provide” for a system of common schools. The court should reject 
this idea because the doctrine of separation of powers in California has 
never been subject to a strict formalistic interpretation. 
As scholars have noted, since the 1850s the California Supreme 
Court has not adhered to a formal separation of executive, legislative, 
and judicial powers.192 Instead, it has adopted a “core powers analysis,” 
 
 189. Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 743 P.2d 1323, 1387 (Cal. 1987) (“Where 
uncertainty exists consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular 
interpretation.”). 
 190. Josh Kagan, A Civics Action: Interpreting “Adequacy” in State Constitutions’ Education 
Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2241, 2245 (2003). 
 191. See Brief for Respondent at 32, Campaign for Quality Educ. v. State, No. A134423, 2012 WL 
5846476 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2012) (arguing that plaintiffs’ adequacy claims are “nonjusticiable 
because they are matters within the exclusive province of the Legislature”). 
 192. See David A. Carrillo & Danny Y. Chou, California Constitutional Law: Separation of 
Powers, 45 U.S.F. L. Rev. 655, 672 (2011) (citing Superior Court v. County of Mendocino, 913 P.2d 
1046, 1054 (Cal. 1996)) (recognizing substantial interdependence by the branches is a fulfillment, not 
an obstacle, to the “checks and balances” safeguarded by the separation of powers doctrine). 
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where an action is unconstitutional only where the actions of one branch 
“materially impairs” the core powers or functions of another branch.193 
“Under [this] analysis, courts first determine whether the acts of one 
branch implicate the ‘core zone of authority’ or powers of another 
branch.”194 Looking here at the education clause, one can assume that a 
core power is implicated because the legislature is assigned with the duty 
to “encourage” and “provide for” schools.195 However, the analysis does 
not stop there. Courts then determine whether that power has been 
materially impaired.196 Reviewing a legislative action for constitutionality, 
or even imposing reasonable regulations does not materially impair the 
legislature’s duty, and does not control the exercise of legislative 
discretion; it merely limits that discretion in conformance with the 
California Constitution.197 
As the court said in Butt, the State, acting through the supreme 
court, is the ultimate guarantor of the constitutional right to education 
under the California Constitution.198 There, the court noted that “the 
State’s ultimate responsibility for public education cannot be delegated 
to any other entity.”199 It found that “[t]he Constitution has always vested 
‘plenary’ power over education not in the districts, but in the State, 
through its Legislature . . . . The legislative decision to emphasize local 
administration does not end the State’s constitutional responsibility for 
basic equality in the operation of its common school system.”200 Therefore, 
under both supreme court precedent and a core powers analysis, the 
supreme court is well within its constitutional mandate in reviewing 
education clause claims. 
This conforms with other states’ supreme courts’ holdings: once they 
have found a fundamental right to education under their education 
clauses, they have also found that the supreme court can guarantee that 
right.201 As the California Supreme Court itself has held, “[i]f the 
Legislature were at liberty to avoid the behests of the Constitution by 
resolution or law, it would become supreme, and its exposition of that 
instrument would be final and conclusive.”202 Finding the issue to be 
 
 193. Id. at 656. 
 194. Id. at 680. 
 195. Cal Const. art. IX, §§ 1, 5. 
 196. Carrillo & Chou, supra note 192, at 656. 
 197. Id. at 686. 
 198. Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Cal. 1992). 
 199. Id. at 1248. 
 200. Id. at 1254. 
 201. See Neeley v. West Orange-Cove, 176 S.W.3d 746, 776 (Tex. 2005) (“This is not an area in 
which the Constitution vests exclusive discretion in the legislature . . . but instead is accompanied by 
standards. By express constitutional mandate, the legislature must make ‘suitable’ provision for an 
‘efficient’ system for the ‘essential’ purpose of a ‘general diffusion of knowledge.’”). 
 202. Nogues v. Douglass, 7 Cal. 65, 78 (1857). 
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outside the province of the courts would hollow out the right itself. The 
right to education in California is fundamental. To guarantee that right 
with no way to enforce it would amount to a right without a remedy, 
violating an elementary principle in legal jurisprudence.203 
B. Defining Adequacy Under the California Constitution 
Finding a justiciable right, the court should then outline its standard 
for what constitutes an adequate education. State education clause 
litigation has typically resulted in three broad definitions of adequacy:  
(1) those that articulate a vague and broad qualitative standard aimed at 
furthering the state’s interest in producing civic-minded and economically 
productive students but provide little guidance to policymakers; (2) those 
that identify specific . . . capacities and skills that all children should 
receive from public education to serve both the state’s and the students’ 
individual interests . . . ; and (3) those that tie adequacy to state 
educational content standards, which define with a high degree of 
specificity what all children should know and be able to do.204  
But none of these is sufficient to define what the right to education 
means within the context of California history and precedent. There is a 
fourth option, based on Justice Liu’s article Education, Equality, and 
National Citizenship,205 as well as the history and jurisprudence of this 
state. This method requires sufficient education to enable citizens to 
develop a stable economy, become upwardly mobile, and engage in self-
government, such that they are able to participate in the political life of 
the state. 
1. Broad Constitutional Standard 
Butt provides an example of a broad standard that affirms the right 
but gives little guidance to courts or the legislature for how to implement 
it. Butt held that the constitution requires “basic equality of educational 
opportunity,”206 which this Article argues must be a nod to a basic 
educational standard. The advantage of this approach is that it is flexible; 
it does not risk enshrining any one vision of education, and leaves 
localities with the ability to fashion their own programs. The 
disadvantage of this approach, however, is that these broad and vague 
statements do little to guarantee a quality education. Butt has been law 
 
 203. See Peck v. Jenness 48 U.S. 612, 623 (1849) (“A legal right without a remedy would be an 
anomaly in the law.”); Barquis v. Merchs. Collection Ass’n., 496 P.2d 817, 830 (Cal. 1972) (“There is a 
maxim as old as law that there can be no right without a remedy . . . .”); Am. Philatelic Soc’y v. 
Claibourne, 46 P.2d 135, 140 (Cal. 1935) (same); Nougues, 7 Cal. at 80 (“It is a rule as old as the law 
itself, that there is no right without a remedy, and wrong without a redress . . . .”). 
 204. William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When “Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat from Equity in 
Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 Emory L.J. 545, 562 (2006). 
 205. Liu, supra note 13. 
 206. Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1251 (Cal. 1992). 
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since 1992, and still, California students continue to score at nearly the 
bottom of the rankings of nationwide measurements of math and 
reading.207 It also leads to a “guess-and-check” approach to education 
jurisprudence, which keeps litigants, legislators, and courts tied up for 
years trying to find what is constitutional.208 The broad standard has done 
little to define, and therefore guarantee, the right. 
2. Court-Defined Minimum Education Requirements 
The court could instead adopt a definition of adequacy like that 
provided by Kentucky in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc. In 
Rose, the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed its constitution’s education 
clause, which simply provided: “The General Assembly shall, by 
appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system of common schools 
throughout the State.”209 The court held that this language required the 
legislature to establish a system of common schools “that provides an 
equal opportunity for children to have an adequate education.”210 
The Rose court announced that an adequate education must contain 
the following seven “capacities:” 
[A]n efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each 
and every child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient 
oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in a 
complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of 
economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make 
informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes 
to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her 
community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and 
knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient 
grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her 
cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation 
for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to 
enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and 
(vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public 
school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in 
surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.211 
 
 207. See California NAEP Results, Cal. Dep’t Educ., http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/tg/nr/caresults.asp (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2016); see also Jan Mabry, California Students Rank Near Bottom in Math, Reading on 
Standardized Tests, CBS SF Bay Area (Oct. 28, 2015), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2015/10/28/ 
california-students-rank-near-bottom-in-math-reading-on-standardized-tests/.  
 208. See the Abbott cases, currently in their twentieth trip to the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
over more than two decades. Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. 
Burke, 20 A.3d 1018, 1023 (2011).  
 209. Rose v. Council for Better Ed., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 200 (Ky. 1989). 
 210. Id. at 211. 
 211. Id. at 212. Courts sometimes combine the last two of these seven goals. See, e.g., Gannon v. 
State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1233 (Kan. 2014). 
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Following Rose, a number of courts have adopted this approach, 
including the Kansas Supreme Court earlier last year.212 
The advantage of this approach is clear direction to the legislature 
of what the constitutional minimum bar is. It provides guidance to lower 
courts about the minimum floor below which a constitutionally adequate 
education plan may not fall, as well as a reference point to localities 
wishing to provide constitutionally appropriate educations to their 
children. It also has the advantage of conforming much more closely to the 
article IX, section 1 goal of fostering “the promotion of intellectual, 
scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement,” instead of simply 
“ke[eping] up and support[ing]” a system of free schools (which it does 
implicitly).213 
One criticism of this approach is that it constitutes legislating from 
the bench, intruding on the province of the legislature and the long-
standing preference for local control of schools. But the legislature itself, 
with little guidance from the courts, has already adopted standards that 
look considerably like the seven Rose “capacities.” The Rose capacities 
resemble content standards already present in the California Education 
Code, including: 
 (1) English-Language Arts Content Standards for California 
Public Schools214 (emphasizing students who are college and career 
ready in reading, writing, speaking and listening, and language in order 
to, among other skills, demonstrate independence, build strong content 
knowledge, comprehend and critique, value evidence, and understand 
other perspectives and cultures).215 
 (2) History-Social Science Content Standards for California 
Public Schools216 (“[N]ot only to acquire core knowledge in history and 
social science, but also to develop the critical thinking skills that historians 
and social scientists employ to study the past and its relationship to the 
present,” including teaching students to “approach subject matter as 
historians, geographers, economists, and political scientists.”).217 
 
 212. Gannon, 319 P.3d at 1237–38; see also McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 
N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997); 
Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997); Abbeville Cty. School Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 
540 (S.C. 1999). 
 213. Cal. Const. art. IX, §§ 1, 5. 
 214. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., California Common Core State Standards: English Language Arts 
and Literacy in History/Social Studies, Science, and Technical Subjects 9–78 (2013), 
http://www.cde.ca.gov/be/st/ss/documents/finalelaccssstandards.pdf. 
 215. Id. at 6. 
 216. See Cal. Dep’t of Educ., History-Social Science Content Standards for California 
Public Schools: Kindergarten Through Grade Twelve (2000), http://www.cde.ca.gov/be/st/ss/documents/ 
histsocscistnd.pdf. 
 217. Id. at 1–2. 
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 (3) History-Social Science Content Standards for California 
Public Schools218 (including studying U.S. and world government 
institutions, history, and practices in grades two, three, four, five, six, 
eight, ten, eleven, and twelve).219 
 (4) Health Education Content Standards for California Public 
Schools220 (including understanding health enhancing concepts, analyzing 
influences that affect health, accessing and analyzing health information, 
using communication skills, decisionmaking, and goal setting to enhance 
health, among other areas). 
 (5) Visual and Performing Arts Content Standards (including 
proficiency in artistic perception; creative expression; historical and 
cultural context; aesthetic valuing; and connections, relationships, and 
applications of art across subject areas).221 
 (6) Career Technical Education Standards for California Public 
Schools222 (including developing curriculum to ensure that students are 
career and college ready and to prepare them for future careers).223 
 (7) Career Technical Education Standards for California Public 
Schools (including the goal of preparing graduates to successfully compete 
in the global economy).224 
Given the overlap between the Rose factors and California’s own 
content standards, adopting an explicitly Rose-like approach has the 
advantage of requiring no changes in the content standards as they are 
currently constituted. There are additional content standards in the 
California Education Code as well; this is as it should be. The 
constitutionally required minimum is a floor, not a ceiling. 
One criticism of this approach is that it is focused on inputs. Discussions 
of educational inputs usually focus on funding and resources.225 While 
equalizing these inputs sounds appealing at first, such an approach could 
result in reducing educational resources for all in order to ensure equal 
funding.226 Moreover, “equal financial inputs do not yield equal resources,” 
and “equal funding may not translate into equal education, insofar as the 
 
 218. See generally id. 
 219. Id. at 8–10, 12, 14, 15, 26, 33–35, 38, 42, 45, 47, 50, 54–60. 
 220. See generally Cal. Dep’t of Educ., Health Education Content Standards for California 
Public Schools, Kindergarten Through Grade Twelve (2009), www.cde.ca.gov/be/st/ss/documents/
healthstandmar08.pdf. 
 221. Nine Through Twelve-Proficient, Visual and Performing Arts: Visual Arts Content Standards, 
Cal. Dep’t Educ., http://www.cde.ca.gov/be/st/ss/vaproficient.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
 222. CTE Model Curriculum Standards, Cal. Dep’t Educ., http://www.cde.ca.gov/ci/ct/sf/ 
ctemcstandards.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
 223. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., California Career Technical Education Model Curriculum 
Standards 1 (2013), http://www.cde.ca.gov/ci/ct/sf/documents/ctestdfrontpages.pdf. 
 224. Id. at ii. 
 225. Julie Zwibelman, Broadening the Scope of School Finance and Resource Comparability 
Litigation, 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 527, 558 (2001). 
 226. Debra Satz, Equality, Adequacy, and Educational Policy, 3 Educ. Fin. & Pol’y 424, 426–27 (2008). 
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school’s organization and infrastructure ensure that the money is badly 
spent.”227 
Output measures, by contrast, look to the graduation rate, the 
dropout rate, the skill level of students who enter state higher education 
systems, and students’ test results.228 A focus only on inputs or only on 
outputs does not adequately measure educational quality. In order to 
ensure a quality education, officials should consider both inputs and 
outputs when measuring school progress. 
3. Legislatively-Based Minimums 
The third option is looking to the legislature’s content standards, or 
the legislature’s own definition of the right, as the constitutional 
benchmark of an adequate education.229 This standard, which focuses on 
“outputs” such as learning benchmarks rather than “inputs” such as 
school financing, proposes that courts should look to state-developed 
content standards as the constitutional standard of adequacy, declare any 
system where students are not meeting them unconstitutional, and order 
that student achievement be brought up to the articulated standards.230 
This approach is advantageous because “it cannot be readily accused of 
intruding upon separation of powers insofar as those educational content 
standards have been legislatively authorized and (at least tacitly) 
approved.”231 Moreover, state content standards are robust and state-
specific, reflecting the legislature’s (and by extension, the people’s) 
priorities in what constitutes an adequate education. 
The drawbacks to this approach, however, outweigh its advantages. 
First, as a matter of state constitutional jurisprudence, if the court used 
this approach, it would be abdicating its constitutional authority by 
allowing the legislature to define what article IX means. Such an 
approach has no support in the state constitution. Although the 
California Constitution instructs the legislature to establish a system of 
common schools, nowhere does it cede the power to define the right. The 
legislature allocates funding, reviews and updates statewide curriculum, 
certifies teachers, and oversees school facilities upkeep, but all this 
speaks to its ability to fulfill the minimum statewide standards, not to 
define them. 
 
 227. Id.; see also Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 939 (Cal. 1976) (“[A]n equal 
expenditure level per pupil in every district is not educationally sound or desirable because of differing 
educational needs . . . .”). 
 228. Satz, supra note 226, at 426–27. 
 229. See DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 747 (Ohio 1997) (directing the state legislature to 
define adequacy); McUsic, supra note 72, at 337. 
 230. McUsic, supra note 72, at 330. 
 231. Koski & Reich, supra note 204, at 564 (citing William S. Koski, Educational Opportunity and 
Accountability in an Era of Standards-Based School Reform, 12 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 301, 307 (2001)). 
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In addition to being constitutionally suspect, a standards-based 
approach prevents the court from acting as a backstop to prevent the 
legislature from defining the right in such a way that it amounts to no 
right at all.232 The highest courts of both Texas and New York 
acknowledged this problem, retaining in the judiciary the ultimate power 
to determine what the right entails.233 
There are additional practical difficulties with constitutionalizing 
state standards. State standards, particularly California’s, are robust, 
covering the entire range of K12 curriculum, including English-
Language Arts, Mathematics, English Language Development, Career 
Technical Education, Health Education, History-Social Science, Physical 
Education, Science, Visual and Performing Arts, World Language, and 
guidelines for a Model School Library.234 While commendable, it is 
difficult to connect some of these goals either to article IX (education to 
“further intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement”), or 
to the history of the education clauses.235 The requirements for health 
education or physical education, for example, might be best practices in 
education standards, but this does not automatically entitle them to 
constitutional significance. 
The California legislature should be encouraged to adopt robust 
state standards for education, and change them where appropriate, 
without fear that such new standards would create new causes of action 
in state courts. For example, if this year’s state standards mandate a 
certain student to teacher ratio as a benchmark of quality education and 
then next year’s mandate adjusts that standard to create larger class sizes, 
could every child in a newly overcrowded classroom sue for a smaller 
class? If the right to an adequate education is tied directly to the state 
standards, there is little reason why not. Rather than encouraging the 
legislature to experiment with state standards in an effort to create a 
cutting-edge education system, this doctrine could create an unintentional 
“incentive[] for the legislature to water down [its own] standards.”236 
 
 232. William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-examination of the 
Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1185, 1241 
(2003). 
 233. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 332 (N.Y. 2003) (“[S]o to enshrine 
the Learning Standards would be to cede to a state agency the power to define a constitutional 
right.”); Neeley v. West Orange-Cove, 176 S.W.3d 746, 784 (Tex. 2005); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Meno (Edgewood IV), 917 S.W.2d 717, 730 n.8 (Tex. 1995) (“[T]he Legislature may [not] define what 
constitutes a general diffusion of knowledge so low as to avoid its obligation to make suitable 
provision imposed by article VII, section 1” of the Texas Constitution.). 
 234. Content Standards, Cal. Dep’t Educ., http://www.cde.ca.gov/be/st/ss/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
 235. See supra Part I.  
 236. Koski & Reich, supra note 204, at 564–65; Bauries, supra note 126, at 724 (citing James E. 
Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1223, 1233–38 (2008)). 
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4. Citizenship Approach 
In Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, then-Professor 
Liu237 argued that the guarantee of national citizenship found in the 
Fourteenth Amendment obligates the national government to ensure 
educational adequacy.238 Here in California, the education clauses in 
article IX are robust enough to obviate the need to couch the right to 
education inside other constitutional rights, but the effect of these 
arguments is the same: in order to be a citizen, one must have sufficient 
education to be able to participate in the political and economic life of 
the state. Liu argues that “[c]itizenship requires a threshold level of 
knowledge and competence for public duties such as voting, serving on a 
jury, and participating in community affairs, and for the meaningful 
exercise of civil liberties like the freedom of speech.”239  
This is the right approach to take here. From the framers’ debates, 
one can see that California’s founders were concerned primarily with the 
citizenship aspects of a good education, including guaranteeing a stable 
economy, an upwardly mobile populace, and the ability to self-govern, and 
emphasized the necessity of being able to participate in the political life 
of the state,240 John Swett, arguably the father of public education in 
California, urged that physical facilities, desks, and textbooks, as well as 
strong teacher qualifications and pedagogical methods, were essential to 
providing an adequate education (along with state inspection and 
supervision).241 
The California Constitution itself lists a number of rights that are 
integral to the requirements of citizenship in the state, all of which are 
instructive when defining an adequate education. Article I, section 3 
guarantees the right of the people to petition government for redress of 
grievances, and to access information concerning the conduct of the 
people’s business.242 Article I, section 9 protects the right to contract,243 
and article II, section 2 guarantees the right to vote.244 Finally, article I, 
section 19 guarantees the right to trial by jury.245 Each of these rights is 
dependent on an educated populace, with sufficient literacy, verbal, 
math, and civics education to enable it to participate in the economic and 
 
 237. Now an associate justice of the California Supreme Court. 
 238. Liu, supra note 13, at 330. 
 239. Id. at 345. This is the approach of at least one court to address the adequacy issue. In New 
York, adequacy requires learning the “basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable 
children to eventually function productively as civic participants capable of voting and serving on a 
jury.” Campaign for Fiscal Equality v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995). 
 240. 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1087. 
 241. Carr, supra note 22, at 102; Hendrick, supra note 23, at 15. 
 242. Cal. Const. art. I, § 3. 
 243. Id. art. I, § 9. 
 244. Cal. Const. art. II, § 2. 
 245. Cal. Const. art. I, § 19. 
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political life of the state. For example, one must be able to read to vote, 
to write to petition one’s government, and to do math in order to 
participate fully in the economic life of the state (including contracting). 
This approach, too, inevitably invites criticism. First, these baseline 
“citizenship” requirements are far less robust than the state standards. 
Reformers who would argue for a constitutional right to full-service 
schools (such as those that guarantee healthcare, or nutrition) would not 
find the underpinning of that right in this theory. Second, these goals are, 
in some senses, a moving target. The literacy skills necessary to vote and 
serve on juries might have been different at the founding than they are 
now. Similarly, the numeracy skills critical for participating in economic 
life today might in the future be eclipsed by the ability to write code. 
Tying the definition to societal norms might produce a more just 
result, however, for as society changes, the minimum requirements of 
education must change with it. The court could evaluate claims based on 
the citizenship approach to adequate education using a combination of 
inputs (facilities, teaching tools, textbooks, and funding) and outputs 
(ability of students to pass state tests in certain subjects). Both methods 
find support in California Supreme Court case law.246 
V.  The Court Must Define and Clarify the Right to Education in 
Order to Prevent Confusion Among Lower Courts. 
The Supreme Court of California must eventually define the meaning 
of article IX. Even now, there are ongoing lawsuits about teacher tenure, 
layoffs, dismissal,247 inadequate instructional time,248 and statewide denial 
of English learner instructional services,249 all of which will touch on, if not 
rely on, the court’s interpretation of what article IX requires. Recent 
settlements regarding teacher layoffs,250 the use of unproven teaching 
methods,251 and school fees,252 as well as the ongoing procedure in place 
after the settlement in Williams v. State253 regarding school resources, 
show that courts at all levels remain actively involved in defining the 
right to education. 
 
 246. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 939 (Cal. 1976) (ascribing differences in pupil 
achievement to “differences in dollars,” but also condoning the use of “pupil output as a measure of 
the quality of a district’s educational program”). 
 247. Vergara v. State, No. BC484642 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 1, 2014). 
 248. Complaint at 1–8, Cruz v. State, No. 14727139 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 29, 2014). 
 249. D.J. v. State, No. BS142775, 2014 WL 4064226 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 24, 2014). 
 250. Complaint, Reed v. State, No. BC432420, 2011 WL 10893745 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 18–21, 
2011) (settled in 2014).  
 251. Complaint, Doe 1 v. State, No. 34-80001164 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 30, 2012) (settled in 2012). 
 252. Complaint at 1, Doe v. State, No. BC445151 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2010) (dismissed in 2012 
due to new legislation).  
 253. Order Granting Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Second Cause of Action at 3–5, 
Williams v. State, No. 312236 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 10, 2003). 
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Lower courts need guidance from the supreme court to decide these 
critical questions. In recent education cases, courts have shown confusion 
about California’s education jurisprudence and a misunderstanding 
about the constitutional mandate. For example, in a superior court order 
in Reed, the court alternated its discussion of “basic equality of 
educational opportunity,” an equal-protection-focused phrase coined in 
Butt, with a description of “basic educational opportunity,” implying an 
adequacy mandate.254 Other courts have split on their interpretation of 
Butt’s command for “basic educational equality.”255 
For example, in Williams, plaintiffs alleged that California failed to 
provide adequate, safe, and healthy facilities; enough qualified teachers, 
libraries, and instructional materials; and schools that were not 
overcrowded.256 There, the superior court in San Francisco dismissed 
plaintiffs’ causes of action under article IX, sections 1 and 5, holding that 
these sections are not self-executing in all circumstances because 
education is assigned to the state legislature.257 Even while reaffirming a 
right to “basic educational equality” from Butt, the court held that 
sections 1 and 5 were directed to the legislature, not the courts, and that 
section 1 “merely indicates principles, without laying down rules by 
means of which those principles may be given the force of law.”258 The 
court, notably, avoided deciding whether section 5 creates a “substantive, 
actionable right to education.”259 
An entirely different interpretation came out of the superior court 
in Los Angeles, in the recent case of Vergara v. State. There, plaintiffs 
alleged that the state’s teacher tenure laws resulted in “grossly 
ineffective” teachers.260 In finding for the plaintiffs, the court held that 
“this Court is directly faced with issues that compel it to apply these 
constitutional principles [of equality] to the quality of the educational 
experience.”261 It characterized the right to education under the 
California Constitution as a mix of equality and adequacy, characterizing 
 
 254. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Final Approval of Settlement, 
Reed v. State, No. BC432420, 2011 WL 10893745, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 18–21, 2011) (affirming 
right to “basic equality of educational opportunity”); id. at *19 (stating that additional turnover at the 
targeted schools “would cause material harm to faculty stability and the ability to deliver basic 
educational opportunity to the students.”) (emphasis added). This was a lawsuit brought on behalf of 
Los Angeles school children whose schools were laying off disproportionate numbers of new teachers, 
disproportionately affecting low-income, minority students. Id. at *1–2. 
 255. Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1251 (Cal. 1992). 
 256. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint at 21–22, Williams v. State, No. 312236 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 14, 2000). 
 257. See Order Granting Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Second Cause of Action, 
supra note 253, at 3–5. 
 258. Id. at 3. 
 259. Id. at 4. 
 260. Tentative Decision at 3, Vergara v. State, No. BC484642 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 1, 2014). 
 261. Id. (emphasis in original). 
F - Gordon_18 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016 1:36 PM 
364 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:323 
the right as a right to “a basically equal opportunity to achieve a quality 
education.”262 This court, unlike the Williams court, found no separation 
of powers barriers to “apply[ing] constitutional principles of law to the 
Challenged Statutes as it has done here, and trust[ing] the legislature to 
fulfill its mandated duty to enact legislation on the issue herein discussed 
that passes constitutional muster.”263 
The California Court of Appeal has also weighed in on the issue in 
the context of home schooling. In Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, the 
court undertook a review of other states’ methods of guaranteeing that 
their home schooled children were receiving an adequate education.264 
The court went on to detail other states’ mechanisms for ensuring an 
adequate home school education, including requirements to ensure 
capable teaching, student progress by way of evaluations, individualized 
education plans for each student and reports on those plans, annual 
assessment, and the option to terminate home schooling if objectives are 
consistently unmet.265 The court ended its opinion with a plea: “Given the 
state’s compelling interest in educating all of its children (Cal. Const., art. 
IX, § 1), and the absence of an express statutory and regulatory 
framework for home schooling in California, additional clarity in this 
area of the law would be helpful.”266 
The supreme court must heed this call. As outlined above, the 
Williams court’s reading of the state’s constitution comports neither with 
the framers’ intent nor with the history of constitutional litigation in 
education in this state. Yet, without clear direction about the meaning of 
the education clauses, courts will continue to produce inconsistent 
jurisprudence. 
Conclusion 
Since the California Supreme Court’s decision in Serrano I, there is 
no doubt that the state constitution guarantees the right to an education, 
and an education that encompasses more than simply “access to a 
schoolhouse.” Although equal protection litigation has done much to 
level the playing field, thousands of students are still deprived of a bare 
minimum of educational qualityan unconstitutional result given the 
text and history of the constitution, the education case law in California, 
and the similar conclusions of supreme courts nationwide. The Supreme 
Court of California must weigh in on this issue, to reduce confusion in 
the lower courts and produce a more just educational system for 
California’s children. The citizenship approach, in which the supreme 
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 264. See Jonathan L. v. Superior Ct., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 595–96 (2008). 
 265. Id. at 596. 
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court evaluates whether schools provide enough education to teach 
students to be citizens, finds support in the history and language of the 
California Constitution, in corresponding constitutional provisions 
guaranteeing civic participation, in the education case law, and in the 
logical underpinnings of article IX. An inadequate education is not an 
education. This is the approach that the court should take. 
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